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ABSTRACT This paper addresses vulnerability of revenue to external shocks using export composition to
capture economic structure and differentiating countries according to income levels, resource endowments and
political regimes. This gives a richer characterisation than previous studies. Lower income countries are
vulnerable to shocks, especially in terms of trade (associated with the greatest revenue loss): democratic regimes
seem to be less vulnerable to revenue losses due to shocks than non-democracies whereas revenue in resource rich
countries is more vulnerable to shocks (except natural disasters) than non-resource rich countries. We find a
negative relationship between manufacturing exports and revenue in lower income countries.
1. Introduction
The literature on tax performance of developing countries largely comprises cross-country regression
analysis to identify determinants, with some papers specifically considering if aid affects performance
(Morrissey & Torrance, 2015). There are also studies aiming to assess the effects of reforms, such as in
public financial management or revenue authorities, taking a case study approach (Moore, 2014).
Ahlerup, Baskaran, and Bigsten (2015) is an exception including both approaches, using cross-country
panel data for sub-Saharan African countries to explore the revenue impact of introducing VAT (no
effect) and semi-Autonomous Revenue Authorities (increase revenue). The findings from cross-
country studies are rather limited; usually robust results only confirm that tax/GDP ratios are related
to broad proxies for the tax base such as shares of agriculture, industry and international trade in the
economy. This paper revisits and contributes to that literature in two ways. First, with a richer set of
tax base indicators based on export composition we allow for the effect of shocks to address
vulnerability of revenue as an additional dimension of tax performance. Second, we allow for country
heterogeneity in various ways by considering how determinants of revenue/GDP ratios including
shocks vary according to income levels, resource endowments and political regimes. This gives us a
richer characterisation of tax performance by economic structure than previous studies and highlights
particular challenges facing low-income countries in sustaining increased tax revenue.
Financing for development requires developing countries to improve their domestic revenue
mobilisation, but many low and lower-middle income countries may be failing to tap their full revenue
potential (International Monetary Fund, 2011). One issue not sufficiently addressed in this context is
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the vulnerability of public revenue in developing countries to exogenous shocks. It has been conven-
tional wisdom for some time that a narrow tax base combined with an excessive reliance on a few
commodity exports exposes countries to the risk of increased economic and revenue volatility and,
ultimately, lower levels of tax collection. Beyond this general statement there is a knowledge gap
regarding the relationship between exogenous shocks and public revenue in a broad and diverse range
of low and lower-middle income countries.
In addition to the general impact of shocks on the economy there are specific effects of shocks on
revenue systems that may affect the capacity of governments to react to adverse external events and
sustain development expenditure. These effects vary not only with the kinds of shock affecting the
economies, but also with the characteristics of these economies (for example, level of development,
dependence on natural resources), the political and administrative capacity of states to react to
changing situations, and the structure of the tax systems. Shocks do not only affect the level of tax
collection, but also (perhaps even more importantly) the stability and predictability of revenue. It can
be argued that the latter is critical for adaptation to exogenous changes and the ability of public
revenue to recover from adverse external events.
Following existing literature, we begin with a standard tax performance specification represent-
ing the structure, openness and level of development of the economy but include a richer range of
indicators than most studies: the shares of agricultural, mining, manufacturing and fuel exports to
GDP along with imports to GDP rather than a single combined measure of trade to GDP. Measures
of exposure to three exogenous shocks (exchange rate pressure, terms of trade and intensity of
natural catastrophes) are then added, allowing these to be non-linear in order to test if large shocks
have a particularly strong impact. Following baseline fixed effects estimates for the full sample
classified by income levels and allowing for time trends across countries, the particular features of
lower income countries are explored further according to natural resource endowments and political
regime type.
Section 2 provides a brief review of the existing literature to set the context. Section 3 outlines the
empirical approach and discusses the data, covering up to 152 countries over 1980–2010. The main
results are presented and discussed in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes by discussing the character-
istics of lower income countries associated with tax revenue performance and vulnerability.
2. Literature Review
With regard to tax systems, the concepts of vulnerability and resilience refer to different functions,
such as revenue generation, distribution, stabilisation of income and legitimacy. Apart from affecting
the amount of revenue collected, external shocks influence above all the stability of revenues and,
hence, their predictability with regard to budgeting and public service delivery. Vulnerability is
interpreted in terms of sensitivity and capacity to recover; resilient tax systems are those that are not
vulnerable to shocks (low sensitivity) or are able to recover quickly; tax systems that are not resilient
are very sensitive to shocks and revenue recovers slowly. Further, external shocks may alter the
distributive effects of existing tax systems, thus undermining (or strengthening) their legitimacy.
The standard approach in the literature (Gupta, 2007; Le, Moreno-Dodson, & Bayraktar, 2012;
Profeta & Scabrosetti, 2010; Tanzi, 1992; Teera & Hudson, 2004) is to model the revenue to GDP ratio
as determined by variables chosen to proxy for the tax base and structure of the economy. The proxy
indicators most commonly used in developing countries are: (i) agriculture and industry value added as
a percentage of GDP; (ii) openness to international trade; and (iii) GDP per capita. Studies sometimes
include aid, demographic features such as urbanisation, or indicators of governance and institutions. A
broad summary of the literature suggests:
● Tax performance is lower the larger the share of agriculture in GDP and the smaller the share of
industry or manufacturing. A large agricultural sector reduces taxable capacity as in low income
countries agriculture is largely a subsistence activity which is difficult to tax directly. A large
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industrial sector is easier to monitor and tax, and a larger share of manufacturing in GDP captures
economic development and a larger formal (taxable) sector.
● Trade taxes are relatively easy to collect and have historically been a major share of tax revenue in
low-income countries (Aizenman & Jinjarak, 2009; Greenaway & Milner, 1991). As agriculture
itself is difficult to tax developing countries often levied taxes on commodity (cash crop) exports as
a way of taxing the sector, and also tended to impose high tariffs on imports. Thus, many studies
include the trade volume measure of openness (the sum of exports and imports as a percentage of
GDP) and it is usually significant (with a positive effect).
● GDP per capita is included as a proxy for the level of economic development to capture
increased tax buoyancy (the responsiveness of revenue to income growth) and collection
efficiency (Tanzi, 1992). Results are quite mixed and the variable is often insignificant, and
sometimes significant but negative. The latter suggests that country differences may be impor-
tant; for example, many East Asian countries have lower revenue than would be predicted by
their economic structure, whereas the low revenue of poor African countries is captured by their
high share of agriculture. Furthermore, multi-collinearity of variables such as GDP per capita
and agriculture share leads to an imprecise estimation of coefficients (von Haldenwang &
Ivanyna, 2012).
● There are no consistent findings for other variables that are often included, for example, Gupta
(2007) tests for political variables such as government stability, political stability, law and order,
and democracy but fails to find robust results.
Many governance variables have been included to account for societal choices regarding the role of
the state, but few are consistently significant: Gupta (2007) and Le et al. (2012) use International
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) data on institutional quality; Mkandawire (2010) uses indicators of
colonial experience; and Ehrhart (2012) relies on World Bank Governance Indicators. Nevertheless,
it seems likely that institutional features shape the capacity of governments to collect taxes. A growing
body of research explores the relation between political regimes and tax collection (for example,
Ehrhart, 2012; Moore, 2008); Garcia and von Haldenwang (2016) find a U-shaped relation between
political regimes and tax ratio, with full autocracies and full democracies collecting significantly
higher shares than political regimes located between both margins. Baskaran and Bigsten (2013) find a
positive association with democracy in some specifications for 31 sub-Saharan African countries over
1990–2005.
It is likely that the features discussed so far with reference to the level of revenue are also relevant
for the vulnerability of tax revenues facing external shocks, although there are few clear guidelines
regarding the choice of variables to include. External shocks refer to ‘a sudden event beyond the
control of the authorities that has a significant negative impact on the economy’ (IMF, 2003, p. 4).
Empirical studies covering the impact of shocks on public revenue in developing countries are scarce.
The most commonly employed measure for external shocks is changes in the terms of trade (Rodrik,
1998). Raddatz (2007) argues that changes in commodity prices are the most important external source
of GDP fluctuations in low-income countries, and GDP instability is a good proxy for exposure to
shocks (Ebeke & Ehrhart, 2012; Lledó & Poplawski-Ribeiro, 2013). Natural disasters affect entire
societies, countries or regions and the severe economic impacts can be expected to affect fiscal
revenues in developing countries: ‘between 1997 and 2001, the average damage per natural disaster
was over 5 per cent of GDP in low-income countries [and] 97 per cent of disaster-related deaths were
in developing countries [between 1990 and 1998]’ (IMF, 2003, pp. 4–6).
Many studies exploring the impact of different variables on tax effort or tax performance assume
that there are sub-sets in the sample characterised by specific properties. The literature provides us
with some initial clues regarding the identification and tax performance behaviour of specific country
groups. Level of income is a plausible criterion; Le et al. (2012) observe that the world-wide increase
in tax revenue between 1998 and 2009 was particularly pronounced in low income countries. Resource
endowment is likely to be important as extractive industries are a potential source of revenue. The
nature of the political regime may affect revenue by influencing the formulation of tax policies and
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shaping the capacity of states to enact tax legislation and manage tax systems (von Haldenwang &
Ivanyna, 2010).
Current knowledge regarding the relationship of tax revenue and exogenous shocks in developing
countries is limited to a handful of rather basic insights, such as, for instance, high revenue volatility
originating from taxing commodity exports. The two most relevant debates in this context – on
developing countries’ tax effort and performance on the one hand, and on growth volatility and
exposure to shocks on the other hand – have not been brought together in a systematic manner. The
empirical analysis that follows aims to provide a systematic approach.
3. Research Design
The short literature review sketched out above helps to identify the variables to include for incorpor-
ating shocks into the analysis of revenue performance. Research in this area has been hampered by a
lack of reliable data, in particular from low and lower-middle income countries, henceforth termed
lower income countries to distinguish from higher income (upper-middle and high) developing
countries. Almost all studies use the revenue/GDP data provided by the IMF and we follow that
practice for comparability (Ahlerup et al. (2015) use the recent independently compiled Government
Revenue Dataset). In addition to basic problems in the accuracy of tax data for lower income
countries, definitional problems arise: there are differences between central and general government
revenue, between tax and total revenue and in how resource rents are treated. It is not evident that the
data are based on a consistent definition across countries and over time. Nevertheless, using the same
data source as previous studies allows for comparability with the literature, but any conclusions must
be cautious.
We follow the standard approach reviewed in Section 2, with some adjustments in variables used,
introducing measures of different types of shocks and presenting results for different groups of
countries. Definitions and sources for the data can be found in Appendix Table A1. The analysis is
conducted on a sample of annual observations covering 1980 to 2010. Exceptions for the length of the
observation period for certain countries arising from data limitations and classification changes are
indicated in the lists of sample countries in the Online Appendix.
While sector shares of agriculture and industry and the trade volume measure of openness are
suitable for cross-country analysis with period averages, especially for reasonably long periods, results
are not robust. These measures are less suitable for panel studies with annual data or short period
averaged data because shares of agriculture and industry in GDP will tend to change only slowly over
time (typically following a clear trend) and shares themselves are poor measures of sector performance
(as an indicator of the tax base). The trade volume measure of openness is also of questionable
relevance as it combines imports and exports; both are taxed but the applicable tax rates vary and have
been changed in different ways. We consider it more helpful to distinguish the import/GDP ratio, as an
indicator of the tax base for tariffs, from the export/GDP ratio that can be interpreted more as an
indicator of the performance of major sectors in the economy (as many countries eliminated direct
export taxes from the 1980s). It is also useful to allow for the composition of exports (which reflects
the structure of the economy) so we aim to distinguish agriculture (soft commodities), minerals (‘hard’
commodities), fuels and manufactured exports, all measured as shares of GDP. The basic specifica-
tion is:
Rev ¼ f agri x; min x; fuel x; man x; M ; Yð Þ þ ε (1)
Total revenue (Rev) is measured as a ratio of GDP and ε is a standard error term. Agricultural exports
(agri_x), mineral exports (min_x), fuel exports (fuel_x), manufactured exports (man_x) and imports
(M) are also measured relative to GDP. Treating each type of export separately allows for differential
performance of separate parts of the economy, which may be related to external shocks and the tax
structure. For example, climatic shocks are most likely to affect agricultural exports; product-specific
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world price or demand shocks may affect exports of particular commodities; and manufactured exports
should be the most resilient to the external shocks analysed here. GDP per capita (Y) is included as a
measure of the level of development that is expected to reflect administrative capacity and tax
collection efficiency.
Three exogenous shocks are considered (definitions are in Appendix Table A1). The exchange rate
pressure index (ER_p) is a proxy for export demand and foreign capital flow shocks, widely used in
international finance literature (Aizenman & Hutchison, 2012; Kaminsky, Lizondo, & Reinhart, 1998).
It is generally defined as a weighted average of percentage changes of policy variables in response to
current account or financial account shocks. We use the following definition:
PIit ¼ wE;i ΔEitEi;t1  wRES;i
ΔRESit
RESi;t1
(2)
where i identifies the country, t is the year, E is the exchange rate in local currency units per USD, RES
is the size of reserves, wE;i and wRES;i are country-specific weights: wE;i ¼ σRES;iσRES;iþσE;i ;wRES;i ¼
σE;i
σRES;iþσE;i .
Here σRES;i is the standard deviation of
ΔRESit
RESi;t1
in country i in 1980–2012, σE;i is the same for
ΔEit
Ei;t1
. The
logic behind the index is that in response to an adverse balance of payment shock a country could
employ different strategies: the government could devalue the currency, but it could also use its
international reserves to defend the exchange rate. Both policy variables should be considered in
measuring the magnitude of external shocks. The weights in Equation (2) are country-specific and
chosen so that the more volatile series gets a smaller weight. To reduce the impact of outliers, the ER
pressure index is transformed so:
ER pit ¼ sign PIð Þlog 1þ PIj jð Þ (3)
We assume tax revenue in countries with developed capital and financial markets to be more
vulnerable to ER pressure. Capital outflows affect above all the financial sector and those companies
that are able to borrow abroad. These sectors typically pay larger shares of personal and corporate
income taxes. At the same time, countries with sound and credible policies (for example, countries
with political regimes that enjoy more trust from the markets) are expected to be less vulnerable to ER
pressure. For instance, the effect of capital outflows on the economy, and on financial intermediation
in particular, is much stronger if a country’s financial markets are not properly regulated.
The second shock that we use is the terms of trade (ToT) index, scaled as the unit price of imports
divided by unit price of exports, the factor most likely to increase vulnerability of government revenue
to ToT shock is the reliance on trade taxes. Economies that are not sufficiently diversified and unable
to quickly reorient their exports according to price changes are expected to be more vulnerable. Some
countries may reduce their vulnerability to ToT shocks by establishing insurance mechanisms against
these shocks. For instance, a number of resource-rich countries follow a fiscal rule, by which they save
extra revenue in a stabilisation fund when times are good and then use revenue from the fund when
times are bad. Countries with access to (and trust of) international capital markets may protect
themselves against ToT shocks by adjusting their borrowing needs.
The third shock we explore is the intensity (in terms of people killed and affected) of natural
catastrophes (NC). We assume that natural disasters negatively impact on government revenue by
damaging public infrastructure and affecting economic activity. Countries with larger shares of
agriculture are expected to be more vulnerable. The measure of intensity of natural disasters follows
Fomby, Ikeda, and Loayza (2009) by calculating the approximate magnitude of impact for each type of
disaster (drought, earthquake, flood and storm) relative to the population size as the ratio of the sum of
the number of casualties plus 30 per cent of the total number of people affected to the population size
(a ratio greater than 1% is indicative for a severe impact).
The exogenous shocks are measured as continuous variables and ordered so that higher values mean
worse outcomes. For instance, the 90th percentile of ER pressure is 2.86, which roughly corresponds
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to a weighted average of currency devaluation and decline in reserves of 16.5 per cent. In order to
identify the sign and the magnitude of the effect that a shock has on tax revenue, we first fit the
following linear regression:
rev i;tf g ¼ αþ βw i;tf g þ ΓX i;tf g þ  i;tf g (4)
where i is the country index, and t is the year index; rev is total revenue (as percentage to GDP); w is
external shock (ToT, ER_p, NC), X is the vector of our controls as in Equation (1) and ε is a random
error. Our interest is the estimate of β.
The OLS estimator of β may not be consistent because of the relationship between historical
averages of rev and w. To control for this we will use fixed effects panel estimation, similar to the
approach to climate shocks in Deschênes and Greenstone (2007, 2011):
rev
::
i;tf g ¼ αþ β w:: i;tf g þ Γ X
::
i;tf g þ 
::
i;tf g (5)
Here for any variable a, ä denotes its time-demeaned value:
a
::
i;tf g ¼ a i;tf g  1=T
X
t
a i;tf g ¼ a i;tf g  a (6)
Fixed effects (FE) panel estimation tests the relationship between random deviations of an external
factor from its historical mean and deviations of revenue from its historical mean – exactly what we
mean by identifying the effect of a random shock. Applying FE to level data is equivalent to
demeaning the data and running OLS; this is what is shown in Equations (5) and (6) so FE regression
is exactly what we need to identify revenue volatility. Note that with some shocks FE would still be
insufficient to identify the causal effect. For instance, a shock to international capital flows may arise
due to both exogenous push factors (for example, US interest rate) and endogenous pull factors (for
example, misalignment of real exchange rate). Nevertheless, the FE method would still provide for a
more robust estimation of associations in the data. To control for time-invariant variables, as well as
for country-specific time trends common to all variables, we also estimate fixed effects with individual
slopes (FEIS) using a country-specific quadratic time trend.
4. Results
After presenting baseline results for the full sample we restrict focus to the core estimates for lower
income countries (further details are available on request). Initial results on the determinants of
revenue performance are presented in Table 1. The dependent variable in all regressions is general
government total revenue without grants as a share of GDP, including tax and other revenue (from
property income, interest payments, sales of goods and services, and so forth). This broader category
accounts for the often considerable non-tax revenue accruing from natural resource endowments.
Three estimation methods are employed: pooled OLS, fixed effects (FE), and fixed effects with
country-specific quadratic time trend (FEIS) to allow for within heterogeneity. All specifications
include year dummies; standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and serial correlation
within country. The final column excludes countries with the largest export/import figures (see notes to
Table 1). Standard errors are clustered by country to control for any heteroscedasticity and serial
correlation within a country; with up to 30 time periods for each country this generates quite large
standard errors so we are using conservative significance levels.
The results vary according to the methods used, especially comparing OLS with the more reliable
FE or FEIS. Mineral and fuel exports are most consistently associated with higher revenue (and in all
FE specifications), and fuel exports are positive and statistically significant in all specifications.
Manufacturing exports and share of agriculture in GDP have negative signs in all specifications, but
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are not consistently significant. The contribution of imports is very small, and as with agricultural
exports is positive in the one case where it is significant. The exclusion of outliers does not seem to
matter much for our results except that imports are significant and Agri_VA becomes insignificant;
otherwise neither magnitudes nor significance change substantially. This suggests that the low
statistical significance of the coefficients and small magnitude for some may stem from overall
heterogeneity of countries that we pool together in these regressions.
Heterogeneity between countries is demonstrated in Table 2 where we include shocks and divide the
sample into lower (low and lower-middle) and higher (high and upper-middle) income groups, which
transpire to be quite different (as could be anticipated). The near zero effect of imports/GDP in our
pooled regressions is explained by the opposite ways this variable acts in countries with different
income: it is negative and mostly insignificant in higher income countries (HICs), perhaps reflecting
relatively low tariffs given import levels, whereas in lower income countries (LICs) it is positive, large
and statistically significant (consistent with the importance of tariff revenues). The positive relation-
ship between mineral exports and revenue seems to be driven by HICs, significant for ER and NC
shocks, whereas the negative relationship between manufacturing exports and revenue is due to LICs
(significant for ToT and NC shocks). The coefficient on fuel exports is always positive but only
significant for LICs (and in the case of NC shocks for HICs). The share of agriculture in GDP is never
significant.
The negative coefficient on manufacturing exports for LICs is counter-intuitive at first glance.
Higher shares of manufacturing in the economy are expected to indicate a relatively larger formal
Table 1. Base specification: determinants of revenue performance
Full sample
OLS FE FEIS FE
All All All No outliers
Agri_x 0.233*** −0.006 0.023 −0.042
(0.079) (0.051) (0.032) (0.050)
Min_x −0.000408 0.224** 0.116** 0.209*
(0.081) (0.112) (0.050) (0.118)
Fuel_x 0.209*** 0.255*** 0.168*** 0.286***
(0.056) (0.095) (0.050) (0.072)
Man_x −0.089 −0.080** −0.052* −0.122**
(0.055) (0.040) (0.028) (0.061)
M 0.007 0.007 −0.011 0.055*
(0.048) (0.034) (0.020) (0.029)
Agri_VA −0.174** −0.089 −0.090*** −0.081
(0.082) (0.060) (0.019) (0.058)
Y 3.757*** 1.536 0.937 0.741
(0.750) −1.730 −1.187 −1.658
Constant 1.973 16.59 −0.440* 21.73
−7.891 (14.21) (0.253) (13.52)
R2 0.663 0.189 0.085 0.219
Observations 2,332 2,332 2,330 2,192
N 152 152 150 148
Notes: All export variables (_x), imports (M) and agriculture value added (Agri_VA) are measured as a ratio of
GDP; GDP per capita (Y) is in logs; N refers to number of countries. Under FEIS Mexico and Tajikistan are
dropped because each have only one observation (one year with all variables). Robust standard errors in
parentheses: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. OLS – ordinary least squares (pooled); FE – fixed effects;
FEIS – fixed effects with individual slopes (linear and quadratic). No outliers: excluding countries with Manuf.
Exp/GDP > 45 per cent or Imports/GDP > 100 per cent or Fuel Exp/GDP > 60 per cent; four countries are omitted
completely (as compared to FE): Hong Kong, Libya, Lesotho and Singapore. We also excluded countries with a
population of less than 300,000 to control for specific patterns of small states without observing major changes to
our results (available on request).
Tax revenue vulnerability 1695
sector that is easier to tax than the informal sector, and so is expected to be associated with higher tax
revenue. It is also the case that formal firms, in contrast to informal microenterprises, are more likely
to export. The coefficient ceases to be significant for LICs with ToT shocks only if the imports/GDP
variable is omitted (results available on request). Controlling for country openness to trade, manu-
facturing (and mineral) exports are more vulnerable to ToT shocks than other exports in LICs. A
plausible interpretation is that for manufacturing in poorer countries to be globally (export) competi-
tive they need to restrain labour costs and margins; wages and profits are low so the sector makes no
significant contribution to the tax base. The results are also consistent with global fragmentation of
production: manufacturing exports of poor countries are based on adding a small amount of value
added to imported intermediate inputs, hence they do not contribute much to domestic tax revenue
(although any tariffs on the imports do contribute). To the extent that greater manufacturing exports are
associated with the presence of foreign investment this may also reflect difficulties in taxing multi-
nationals. The significant negative coefficient on man_x for LICs under NC shocks suggests that
manufacturing is vulnerable to the disruption associated with natural disasters (perhaps due to effects
on transport and energy supply).
There are differences in the importance of shocks between the two groups of countries. Exchange
rates shocks only have a significant adverse effect on revenue in HICs; for LICs the significance is
weak and only for large shocks. However, large ER shocks imply a greater revenue loss for LICs than
HICs. In both groups ToT shocks have an adverse impact; the significance is greater for LICs and in
Table 2. Shocks and revenue performance by income groups (fixed effects estimates)
Exchange Rate (ER_p) Terms of Trade (ToT) Natural Disaster (NC)
Higher Lower Higher Lower Higher Lower
Shock −0.193*** −0.077 −4.387** −4.327*** −5.916 −7.868**
(0.069) (0.059) (2.069) (1.453) (9.147) (3.721)
Large Shock −0.364 −0.989* 1.930** −0.279 0.215 0.376
(0.749) (0.525) (0.850) (0.636) (0.924) (0.250)
Agri_x −0.004 0.030 0.002 −0.002 0.024 0.046
(0.090) (0.060) (0.101) (0.063) (0.091) (0.063)
Min_x 0.390*** 0.004 0.115 −0.137* 0.281* −0.005
(0.080) (0.105) (0.171) (0.082) (0.158) (0.096)
Fuel_x 0.162 0.309*** 0.155 0.299*** 0.334** 0.323***
(0.117) (0.064) (0.169) (0.091) (0.163) (0.064)
Man_x −0.069 −0.063 −0.033 −0.083* −0.071 −0.081*
(0.058) (0.042) (0.051) (0.047) (0.061) (0.045)
M −0.058 0.120*** −0.025 0.116*** −0.095** 0.107***
(0.035) (0.029) (0.041) (0.033) (0.045) (0.032)
Agri_VA −0.372 −0.095 −0.245 −0.057 −0.292 −0.098
(0.250) (0.068) (0.269) (0.048) (0.237) (0.067)
Y −3.768** 3.800** −2.870 2.814 −0.592 4.326**
−1.881 −1.796 −2.180 −1.815 (2.696) (1.767)
Constant 74.42*** −7.938 59.38*** −0.876 45.46* −11.13
(17.28) (13.12) (21.55) (12.97) (25.00) (12.79)
R2 0.301 0.253 0.311 0.280 0.301 0.256
Obs 1,082 1,112 706 1,029 1,091 1,173
N 83 92 76 92 81 96
Notes: As for Table 1. The sample classified into Higher (HIC and UMIC) and Lower (LMIC and LIC) income
countries is listed in the Online Appendix. The number of observations depends on data availability for shocks
and revenue. Large Shock: equal to 1 if ER_p, ToT or NC is above 90th percentile of the general distribution of the
shock (similar results were obtained for definitions on the income group specific distribution of shocks, available
on request). We also estimated further model specifications including the shock variables at two different
thresholds for large/largest shocks, above the 75th and 90th percentile or above the 75th and 95th percentile in
the income group specific distribution of shocks; results remain substantially the same (available on request).
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HICs larger shocks appear to reduce this adverse effect. Note that as LICs have lower revenue/GDP
ratios on average, similar coefficients imply a larger proportional revenue loss for LICs. The economic
importance of shocks is greater for LICs.
In the remainder of the analysis we focus on the lower income sample only and chose FE without
exclusion of outliers as our benchmark specification. Compared to FE, FEIS generally produces
smaller coefficient estimates, which are also less statistically significant (results available on request).
The reason is that the inclusion of country-specific time trends wipes out more variation than simply
allowing for country-specific intercepts (as is the case for FE). Wiping out this variation may not
always be reasonable. For instance, an increase in a country’s fuel exports to GDP may very well cause
an increase in its tax ratio. This is the relationship that we want to capture. If we track that country
from the onset of fuel production and export, FEIS may not be able to capture this relationship as both
increases in tax ratio and fuel exports would be accounted for by the time trend. Unlike FE, OLS does
not control for omitted variables that are time-invariant or change only slowly with time. For instance,
within a relatively stable institutional environment of a particular country, an increase in mining
exports to GDP is likely to cause an increase in tax ratio, and this is the effect we want to estimate.
However, institutional environments – and hence tax regimes in the mining industry – between the
countries vary a lot: some countries manage to extract a large share of rents from the mining
companies, whereas other countries do not. As a result, OLS would estimate no empirical relationship
between mining exports and tax ratio, whereas FE would (see Table 1).
We further divide LICs into two groups to check for heterogeneity in the effects of shocks and run
FE regressions with the three shocks. First, LICs are classified as resource rich (RR) and non-resource
rich (NRR) by their natural resource endowment (as classified in IMF, 2012). Second, LICs are
classified as democratic (D) and non-democratic (ND) according to their political regime character-
istics, based on their Polity IV score: on a scale ranging from 10 to −10, a country is considered a
democracy if its Polity IV score is higher than 6 and a non-democracy otherwise (see Marshall, Gurr,
& Jaggers, 2010). Results are presented in Tables 3 and 4.
For interpreting the shock coefficients recall that the FE estimation uses an unbalanced panel of
annual observations so coefficients can be interpreted in accordance with deviations from the mean.
The results suggest significant heterogeneity within LICs. First, consider differences between RR and
NRR lower income countries (Table 3):
● ER pressure is negative and weakly significant only for RR countries. Fuel exports are a positive
and highly significant determinant of revenue for RR countries, as would be expected (and
consistent with the large positive coefficient on GDP per capita). Exchange rate shocks do reduce
revenues in RR countries, on average by about 0.5 percentage points (a one standard deviation
adverse ER_p is 2.4, corresponding to a 10% currency depreciation or loss of reserves). Mineral
and manufacturing exports have weakly significant negative coefficients only for NRR countries,
but exchange rate shocks are insignificant. Countries more reliant on fuel exports (RR) are more
susceptible to exchange rate shocks. However, relatively richer RR countries have higher revenue
(Y is positive and significant) so may be more resilient.
● The coefficient on terms-of-trade shocks is negative and statistically significant in both groups of
countries, but smaller and less significant in NRR countries. Most other results are similar to those
for ER: fuel exports are positive and the more significant for RR countries, whereas manufacturing
exports have significant negative coefficients only for NRR countries. Thus, ToT shocks have a
significant negative impact on revenue irrespective of endowments: a one standard deviation ToT
shock is 0.3 (about a 25% reduction in relative prices) and would reduce revenue by between 1.1
(NRR) and 1.4 (RR) percentage points. Again, RR countries are more susceptible to the shocks.
● The negative effect of natural disasters intensity seems to be driven entirely by NRR countries (it is
insignificant for RR). It appears to be that the extractive industries – the main sources of tax
revenue in RR countries – are less affected by natural catastrophes than other types of economic
activity; fuel exports are positive and significant for both groups. A one standard deviation NC
shock would reduce revenues in NRR countries by about 0.2 percentage points, so far less severe
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than ToT shocks. Furthermore, relatively richer countries appear to have more resilient revenue
under NC shocks (Y is positive and significant for both groups).
● It may seem surprising that fuel exports are usually positive and significant for NRR as well as RR
countries. The threshold for the RR classification used is that the value of fuel exports exceeds 30
per cent of GDP. The majority of NRR have some hydrocarbon exports: the median value is 2.2
per cent of GDP, perhaps due to low production or processing, although for some the value
exceeds 25 per cent (suggesting re-exports). We conducted sensitivity analysis (available on
request) and qualitative results were largely unchanged (the same variables were significant with
similar coefficients). If we set fuel_x = 0 for NRR, the only notable differences are that the ToT
shock coefficient is larger and min_x is insignificant in the NC regression. If we only include NRR
countries for which fuel_x < 10 per cent (or < 5%), fuel_x is significant and other significant
coefficients tend to be a little smaller (except for NC there is a larger negative coefficient on the
shock). At any level, fuel exports are a significant contributor to revenue.
Despite the visible difference between the estimated coefficients for RR and NRR countries, the
Chow tests show no statistical significance: p-values get close to commonly accepted levels when only
coefficients on shocks are tested, except for ToT shocks. This finding is driven by the high standard
Table 3. Effects of shocks on revenues of lower income countries, resource-rich vs. non-resource-rich countries,
fixed effects estimation
Exchange rate pressure
(ER_p)
Terms of trade (in logs)
(ToT)
Intensity of natural
disasters (NC)
Shocks: RR NRR RR NRR RR NRR
Shock Level −0.221* −0.082 −4.54*** −3.608** −3.373 −7.986**
(0.110) (0.062) (1.234) (1.499) (7.401) (3.383)
Agri_x 0.200 −0.0461 0.168 −0.054 0.162 0.002
(0.139) (0.056) (0.142) (0.074) (0.146) (0.059)
Min_x 0.028 −0.587* −0.071 −0.573** 0.003 −0.578*
(0.091) (0.297) (0.083) (0.280) (0.095) (0.292)
Fuel_x 0.289*** 0.258* 0.264*** 0.373** 0.273*** 0.357**
(0.056) (0.130) (0.096) (0.166) (0.059) (0.152)
Man_x 0.002 −0.085** −0.048 −0.089* −0.061 −0.093**
(0.087) (0.038) (0.098) (0.048) (0.075) (0.042)
M 0.064* 0.160*** 0.063 0.148*** 0.049 0.136***
(0.034) (0.032) (0.038) (0.038) (0.033) (0.039)
Agri_VA −0.202** −0.056 −0.088 −0.054 −0.210** −0.062
(0.093) (0.055) (0.066) (0.053) (0.087) (0.057)
Y 6.389** 2.299 4.436 1.485 5.206** 3.362*
(2.404) (1.905) (2.911) (2.161) (2.134) (1.857)
Constant −23.68 2.331 −12.06 8.457 −13.90 −4.740
(16.95) (13.89) (20.01) (15.93) (15.02) (13.56)
R2 0.436 0.234 0.425 0.261 0.441 0.230
Observations 346 766 331 698 385 788
Number of countries 29 63 32 60 32 64
Chow tests:
a. Only shocks
t-statistic −1.13 0.629 1.43
p-value 0.26 0.48 0.16
b. Shocks and structural variables
F-statistic 2.53 1.35 1.60
p-value 0.02 0.23 0.13
Notes: As for Table 1. RR refers to resource-rich and NRR to non-resource-rich countries. The number of
observations varies according to data availability.
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error of a coefficient in at least one of the groups. Chow tests are even less significant when we jointly
test coefficients on shocks and structural variables, suggesting that within the group of LICs RR and
NRR countries are not dramatically different. Thus, one should not over-emphasise the differences
found between the two groups for each shock.
Table 4 reports differences between democratic (D) and non-democratic (ND) lower income
countries:
● ER pressure has a negative effect in both D and ND countries, but is only statistically significant
(and greater) for the ND group. As fuel_x and M are positive and significant for both groups, the
main endowment difference is in man_x which is negative and significant for D only (but ER_p is
insignificant); it may be that democracies are better able to support manufacturing export although
it does not appear to generate revenue. It is the ND regimes that are more susceptible to revenue
loss during ER_p shocks: the magnitude of the effect corresponds to a 0.5 percentage point revenue
loss (similar to RR).
● The coefficient on ToT shocks is also negative and significant for ND countries only, and again is
closer in magnitude to that for RR than NRR countries. A one standard deviation ToT shock would
reduce revenue on average by 1.6 per cent in ND countries. Democratic regimes do appear better
Table 4. Effects of shocks on revenues of lower income countries, democratic vs. non-democratic countries, fixed
effects estimation
Exchange rate pressure
(ER_p)
Terms of trade (in logs)
(ToT)
Intensity of natural
disasters (NC)
Shocks: D ND D ND D ND
Shock Level −0.022 −0.201*** 0.691 −5.231*** −7.248 −5.183
(0.075) (0.068) (2.007) (1.268) (8.877) (4.268)
Agri_x −0.050 0.016 0.037 −0.120 −0.001 0.002
(0.075) (0.106) (0.084) (0.091) (0.086) (0.107)
Min_x −0.229 0.034 −0.202 −0.117 −0.242 0.019
(0.162) (0.111) (0.139) (0.108) (0.148) (0.110)
Fuel_x 0.492*** 0.315*** 0.498*** 0.250** 0.481*** 0.326***
(0.115) (0.068) (0.129) (0.108) (0.113) (0.067)
Man_x −0.149*** −0.066 −0.143*** −0.108* −0.145*** −0.105
(0.052) (0.069) (0.053) (0.064) (0.051) (0.075)
M 0.114* 0.137*** 0.049 0.133*** 0.073 0.135***
(0.064) (0.035) (0.093) (0.029) (0.084) (0.035)
Agri_VA −0.007 −0.192** 0.003 −0.111 −0.013 −0.187**
(0.031) (0.096) (0.020) (0.080) (0.033) (0.090)
Y −0.210 3.488* −0.514 3.606* 0.192 4.180**
(−3.010) (−1.972) (−2.859) (−2.001) (−2.959) (−1.933)
Constant 20.52 −4.290 23.61 −4.771 19.14 −8.737
(22.30) (13.65) (21.08) (13.91) (21.92) (13.20)
R2 0.366 0.322 0.370 0.368 0.360 0.328
Observations 383 651 360 631 386 707
Number of countries 37 66 37 69 37 70
Chow tests:
a. Only shocks
t-statistic 1.10 2.19 −0.26
p-value 0.28 0.03 0.80
b. Shocks & structural variables
F-statistic 2.17 2.09 1.95
p-value 0.03 0.04 0.06
Notes: As for Table 1; D denotes Democracies and ND Non-democracies. The number of observations varies
according to data availability.
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able to extract and sustain public revenue from the oil sector (the coefficient on fuel_x is larger),
and appear far more resilient to ToT shocks. In both groups man_x is negative and significant,
albeit more so in democracies.
● Natural disasters (NC) are not significant for either group of countries, perhaps because the
incidence of disasters is unrelated to the level of democracy.
Democratic LICs fare better than non-democracies in their revenue resilience to shocks (coefficients
are insignificant). For non-democratic LICs, the effects of shocks are negative and statistically
significant (except for NC), varying in impact from 0.1 (NC) to 1.6 (ToT) percentage points loss in
revenue. Chow tests show that many of the differences are significant. Interestingly, imports are more
important (positive and significant) for ND (mostly insignificant for D), whereas the negative
coefficient on manufacturing exports is mostly only significant for D. Whilst acknowledging the
many caveats that apply, democracies do appear to out-perform non-democracies in revenue resilience
to shocks for lower income countries.
The Online Appendix reports sensitivity analysis using interaction terms rather than separate
regressions for two groups. Significance levels are generally low but the core inferences are consistent
with the conclusions above: LICs are more vulnerable to revenue losses from shocks than HICs,
especially for ToT shocks; within LICs democracies are significantly less vulnerable to revenue losses
from shocks than non-democracies and resource rich countries tend to be more vulnerable although
differences are not statistically significant. The results above show that coefficients on explanatory
variables often differ notably between the two groups, so the use of interaction terms is limited: as
including interaction terms for all variables is too demanding of the data separate regressions for
groups are more informative.
5. Conclusions
The main purpose of the analysis is to provide empirical evidence on the vulnerability or resilience of
government revenue under exogenous shocks, especially for lower income countries. The approach
chosen, given the limited quality of the data, is parsimonious estimation methods and conservative
standard errors. This necessarily raises the bar for achieving statistical significance and may lead to
less appealing results in some instances, but it increases the robustness of findings as well as the
credibility of the inferences presented in the following paragraphs. Concerns about endogeneity are
certainly an issue although mitigated by the focus on shocks (unlikely to be influenced by revenue/
GDP) and export composition variables. The results should be read as identifying statistical relation-
ships and not any causal link. Where causal relationships are suggested, they are theoretically
plausible.
Looking at tax performance, it is evident that splitting the sample into lower and higher income
groups is relevant, especially for addressing the differentiated impact of imports and various kinds of
exports. Typically, research on tax effort in developing countries uses one single trade openness
measure (lumping exports and imports) combined with several sector value-added variables (at least
agriculture and industry). Our findings indicate that at least regarding manufacturing and mineral
exports as well as imports the effects on tax performance are quite different, sometimes even opposite
in different groups. It is particularly striking to see that manufacturing exports are associated with less
revenue in the lower income group, especially NRR or democracies. This could be due to low value-
added and productivity of manufacturing so profits (the corporate tax base) are low (and/or difficult to
tax, especially if earned by multinationals) or because wages (the income tax base) are low to maintain
international competitiveness, in either case leading to lower revenues at given tax rates. While
promoting manufacturing exports may be an economically desirable strategy it should not be assumed
to generate increased tax revenues. However, it is only for the non-resource rich lower income
countries that the negative effect of manufacturing exports on revenue is significant.
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The three shocks considered – exchange rate (ER) pressure, terms of trade and the intensity of natural
disasters – have a negative effect on revenue (implying a greater revenue loss for lower than higher
income countries), although it is not always statistically significant. Terms of trade shocks tend to have
the greatest impact, reducing revenues on average by about 1.5 percentage points for lower income
countries (except for democracies where the effect is insignificant), and this is associated with manu-
facturing and mineral exports. In lower income countries, ER shocks are only significant for non-
democracies and resource rich countries, in both cases reducing revenue by 0.5 percentage points on
average. Natural disasters have a much lower impact on revenues, with losses less than 0.2 percentage
points on average and only significant for non-resource rich lower income countries.
The analysis focusses on differences within lower income countries according to endowments and
political regime. A striking result is that democracies do appear to outperform non-democracies in revenue
resilience to shocks for lower income countries (and the differences are statistically significant). For non-
democratic countries, the effects of ER and ToT shocks are negative and significant, whereas for
democracies the shocks are insignificant. This difference could be connected to a larger capacity of
democratic regimes to avoid or compensate revenue losses through public policies and political bargaining,
both on the revenue and expenditure side. Democratic countries seem to benefit more from fuel exports
(coefficients being much bigger than for non-democratic countries), that is a given ratio of fuel exports
translates into more revenue. The positive effect of fuel exports could be related to more common-interest
oriented policies under democratic rule – something several papers in this special issue discuss in case-
specific analyses.
Although resources (mineral and fuel exports) are associated with higher revenue, revenue in
resource rich lower income countries appears more susceptible to exchange rate and ToT shocks
than in non-resource rich countries, seemingly reflecting their greater reliance on fuel exports. The
differences are not statistically significant, perhaps because non-resource rich countries do benefit
from fuel and mineral exports. In contrast, revenue in resource rich countries is unaffected by natural
disaster shocks, unlike in non-resource rich countries (although the magnitude of the effect is small),
suggesting resource sectors are less vulnerable to disasters. Both groups of lower income countries are
adversely affected by terms of trade shocks, and the effects appear quite large in terms of revenue
losses; dependence on commodity exports to a volatile world market increases revenue vulnerability.
All in all, we observe a democracy rent in the sense of lower vulnerability to shocks being associated
with democratic rule in lower income countries. It should be noted, however, that causality is particularly
difficult to establish in this context. Reflecting the focus of this study, we have been inclined to interpret
the findings as outcomes of democratic rule (for instance, assuming a higher ability of democratic
governments to impose short-term hardships on their citizens). Several contributions gathered in this
special issue show how different institutional and organisational settings influence the outcomes of tax
reform. There is also evidence in the literature pointing from higher and more stable revenue to sustained
democratic rule, as governments can spend more on public services. Still, reforms aiming at account-
ability, transparency and rule of law could have an important positive effect on revenue resilience, as
governments may have more legitimacy to build broad-based revenue systems, as well as additional
short-term manoeuvring space to respond to adverse external events.
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Appendix Table A1: Data (1980–2010) Sources and Definitions
Total Revenue Total revenue (per cent of GDP) “Revenue Data for IMF Member Countries
as of 2011” Fiscal Affairs Department,
Tax Policy Division, IMF (IMF Tax-
database)
Total Tax Revenue Total tax revenue (per cent of GDP) IMF Tax- database
GDP per capita GDP per capita World Development Indicators 2012
(“WDI 2012”). Available online: http://
data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-
development-indicators
Agricultural exports Exports of agricultural commodities and
food (per cent of GDP)
Own construction based on data from WDI
2012
Mineral Exports Exports of mineral (non-fuel) commodities
(per cent of GDP)
Own construction based on data from WDI
2012
Fuel Exports Export of fuels (per cent of GDP) Own construction based on data from WDI
2012
Manufacturing Exports Exports of manufactured commodities
(per cent of GDP)
Own construction based on data from WDI
2012
Imports Merchandise imports (per cent of GDP) Own construction based on Merchandise
imports in current USD and GDP in
current USD (WDI 2012)
Terms of trade Terms of trade Net barter terms of trade index (2000 =
100), export/import (WDI 2012)
Intensity of Natural
Disaster
Measure of intensity of natural disaster
based on people killed and affected by
natural disaster in every year t and every
country j. Formula:
Intensityj;t ¼ people killedj;tþ0:3Total affectedj;tpopulationj;t
Own construction based on Fomby / Ikeda /
Loayza 2009, 12–14. Data from the EM-
DAT Database (http://www.emdat.be/)
Income groups Income groups. 4 groups: low income,
lower-middle income, upper-middle
income and high income
Period 1980 to 95 - classification as of 1990;
period 1996 to 2005 - classification as of
2000; period 2006 to 2010 - classification
as of 2011.) Classifications are available
online: http://data.worldbank.org/about/
country-classifications/country-and-lend
ing-groups
Resource rich Resource-rich country dummy IMF (2012)
Democracy 1= democracy 0 =non democratic Based on Polity II Dataset. Values above 6
are considered democracieshttp://www.
systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm
Exchange rate pressure Defined in text Own calculation.
Source: IMF WEO
Note: The correlations between variables are very low, the highest being 0.5 for agri_x and imports, and −0.76 for
agric_VA and GDP per capita (details available on request).
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